During July 1, 1992-June 30, 1999, a total of 323 schoolassociated violent death events occurred in the United States, resulting in 358 deaths (1,2). To guide prevention efforts, CDC examined school-associated firearm violent death events committed by students in elementary and secondary schools in the United States and determined the sources of the firearms used in these events. The findings indicate that, among the incidents for which data are available, the majority of the firearms used in these events were obtained from perpetrators' homes or from friends or relatives. The safe storage of firearms is critically important and should be continued. In addition, other strategies that might prevent firearm-related injuries and deaths among students, such as safety and design changes for firearms, should be evaluated.
Source of Firearms Used by Students in School-Associated
Violent Deaths -United States, 1992-1999
During July 1, 1992-June 30, 1999, a total of 323 schoolassociated violent death events occurred in the United States, resulting in 358 deaths (1, 2) . To guide prevention efforts, CDC examined school-associated firearm violent death events committed by students in elementary and secondary schools in the United States and determined the sources of the firearms used in these events. The findings indicate that, among the incidents for which data are available, the majority of the firearms used in these events were obtained from perpetrators' homes or from friends or relatives. The safe storage of firearms is critically important and should be continued. In addition, other strategies that might prevent firearm-related injuries and deaths among students, such as safety and design changes for firearms, should be evaluated.
A school-associated violent death event was defined as a firearm-related homicide or suicide in which the homicide perpetrator or the suicide victim was an elementary or secondary school student and the fatal injury occurred during July 1, 1992-June 30, 1999, either 1) on the campus of a functioning public or private elementary or secondary school in the United States, 2) while the victim was on the way to or from regular sessions at such a school, or 3) while the victim was attending or traveling to or from an official schoolsponsored event. Cases of school-associated violent deaths were identified through a systematic search of two computerized newspaper and broadcast media databases (Lexis-Nexis and Dialog). Data on the types of weapons used and their sources were collected through interviews with school and police officials and by reviewing official police reports. A perpetrator was defined as a student who committed either a homicide or suicide. Firearms used by perpetrators who committed a homicide and then killed themselves (i.e., a homicidesuicide event) were included in analyses of firearms used by homicide perpetrators.
During July 1, 1992-June 30, 1999, a total of 218 student perpetrators were involved directly in a school-associated homicide or suicide; 123 (56.4%) of these persons used at least one firearm at the time of the event. Among the student perpetrators who were carrying a firearm at the time of the event, 33 (26.8%) committed suicide, 85 (69.1%) perpetrated a homicide, and five (4.1%) perpetrated a homicide-suicide. The majority of these student perpetrators were male (n = 115 [93.5%]). The median age of student perpetrators was 16 years (range: 10-21 years). Of the 90 homicide perpetrators (homicide and homicide-suicide combined), 14 (15.6%) participated in a multiple-victim homicide event, and 76 (84.4%) participated in a single-victim homicide event. One student committed suicide as part of a multiple-victim suicide event.
Five student perpetrators were carrying two firearms each, resulting in a total of 128 firearms used in these events. Of the 128 firearms, 48 (37.5%) came from the perpetrator's home, and 30 (23.4%) came from a friend or relative of the perpetrator; 26 (76.5%) of the firearms used by a student to commit suicide came from the home of the student, and 48 (51.0%) of the firearms used in homicide events came from the home (n = 22 [23.4%]) or from a friend or relative (n = 26 [27.6%]) of the homicide perpetrator ( Table 1 ). The source of 29 (22.7%) firearms used by student perpetrators was unknown.
preventing firearm homicides and suicides among children and youth (5, 6) . This might be because male parents, who are more likely to own firearms and know how they are stored than female parents, are less likely to bring their children to the pediatrician's office (7, 8) . Even when they are aware of a firearm in the home, parents with teenaged children are less likely to store firearms safely than parents with younger children, despite the fact that older children are at greater risk for firearm death (9) .
The results of this study also indicate that it is not enough for parents to eliminate unsupervised access to firearms in their home; approximately 25% of the firearms used in schoolassociated homicides were obtained from friends or relatives. Parents should consider discussing access to firearms and safestorage practices with their relatives and the parents of their children's friends (4) .
The findings in this report are subject to at least four limitations. First, because events were identified from news media reports, any event not reported in the media was excluded. Second, this report includes events associated with schools; other homicide and suicide events involving schoolaged perpetrators might have different firearm-acquisition patterns. Third, the results reported for homicide events might not reflect the true distribution of sources because the source of the firearms in approximately 25% of these events is unknown. Finally, among the student perpetrators who obtained their firearms from home or from friends or relatives, how the students gained access to these firearms is unknown.
The safe storage of firearms is critically important and should be continued. In addition to safe storage of firearms, changing the design of firearms might prevent firearm injuries among teenagers and younger children by making firearms more difficult to use unintentionally or intentionally if stolen or obtained illegally (10) . Many safety features for firearms (e.g., grip safety mechanisms, loaded chamber indicators, and (10) . Although changing product design has benefitted child-poisoning prevention efforts and motor-vehicle safety programs, the impact of product-oriented approaches in reducing youth firearm violence is unknown and requires evaluation (10) . However, the findings in this report can assist parents, school personnel, and the community at large in developing and implementing prevention strategies to decrease school-associated firearm injuries.
Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication -India, 2002
Since the World Health Assembly resolved in May 1988 to eradicate poliomyelitis, the estimated global incidence of polio has decreased >99%, and three World Health Organization (WHO) regions (Americas, Western Pacific, and European) have been certified as polio-free (1). In 1995, India began accelerating polio eradication activities (2) (3) (4) . By 2001, poliovirus circulation had been limited largely to the two northern states of Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar, with 268 cases reported nationwide. However, in 2002, a major regional resurgence of polio occurred. As of January 25, 2003, a total of 1,556 cases were detected nationwide, of which 1,337 (86%) were in UP and Bihar. This report summarizes the *Two specimens collected >24 hours apart within 14 days of paralysis onset and shipped properly to the laboratory.
status of polio eradication activities in India during 2002, analyzes the factors contributing to the resurgence, and describes the actions being taken to reduce poliovirus transmission.
Acute Flaccid Paralysis Surveillance
Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance in India is facilitated by 203 trained surveillance medical officers who assist local health authorities in defined areas. Since 2000, India has exceeded the WHO-established AFP surveillance quality targets (i.e., a nonpolio AFP rate >1 per 100,000 population aged <15 years and adequate stool specimens* taken from >80% of persons with AFP) (Table) . However, during 2002, nonpolio AFP rates were <1 per 100,000 population in five small states (Andaman and Nicobar islands, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Nagaland, and Sikkim), and stool specimen collection rates were inadequate (i.e., <80%) in seven states (Andaman and Nicobar islands, Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Rajasthan, and UP). The nonpolio enterovirus isolation rate (target: >10%), a marker of laboratory performance and the ability to keep stool specimens refrigerated or frozen from collection to arrival at the laboratory, ranged from 11% to 26% in all nine polio laboratories in the national network.
Wild Poliovirus Incidence
During 2002, a total of 1,556 wild poliovirus cases were reported in India, a substantial increase from the 268 cases reported in 2001 (Table) . Of these 1,556 cases, 1,445 (93%) were wild poliovirus type 1 (P1), 108 (7%) were wild poliovirus type 3 (P3), and three (<1%) were mixtures of P1 and P3. UP accounted for 1,218 (79%) cases, with 119 (7%) in Bihar and the remainder in other states. Cases were reported from a total of 155 (27%) of 584 districts nationwide, compared Editorial Note: India, the only remaining country in the South-East Asia Region with ongoing indigenous wild poliovirus transmission, reported a major resurgence of polio in 2002. Surveillance data indicate that UP is the primary area in India with continuing poliovirus transmission. The main reason for continued transmission is insufficient OPV coverage through routine vaccination and SIAs.
The decline in OPV coverage in critical areas during 2002 had at least four primary causes. First, during 1999-2002, the number of NIDs/SNIDs decreased. Second, no NIDs or SNIDs were conducted during January-September 2002, an interval that permitted the accumulation of a large susceptible cohort of newborns. Third, the geographic extent of SIA implementation decreased. Although some smaller-scale SIAs ("responsive mopping-up" activities) were conducted in selected districts where cases occurred during early 2002, the majority of districts in eastern and central UP were not targeted, leaving this area at high risk. Finally, a substantial number of children were missed during SIA rounds. SIA monitoring data in western UP during June-August 2002 indicated that house-to-house teams failed to vaccinate children in <15% of houses in some districts. This suggests that hundreds of thousands of children were missed in areas where high population density, a very large birth cohort, and poor sanitation favor poliovirus transmission. One major factor contributing to poor SIA quality in UP was inadequate engagement and involvement of the general community, particularly members of minority groups.
Additional SIAs are planned for 2003, and major steps to improve SIA quality are underway. During January and February 2003, India had two NID rounds, targeting 164 million children in each. Four SNID rounds are planned in April, June, September, and November, targeting approximately 95 million children in four high-risk northern states (i.e., UP, Bihar, Haryana, and Delhi). These SNID rounds will be followed by two NID rounds in January and February 2004. Monitoring of SIA quality is being enhanced through new vaccinator data collection forms and standardized independent observer checklists that identify general programmatic areas of weakness and specific districts and blocks that show deficiencies in SIA quality. AFP surveillance reviews are being planned. Finally, the state government, WHO, and UNICEF are providing increased support through additional personnel and funding.
The 2002 outbreak in India represented a setback for the national and global polio initiative. However, appropriate steps are being taken to improve monitoring and SIA quality and to correct identified problems. In addition, the natural immunity from the outbreak will provide an opportunity to maximize the impact of SIAs in 2003. Finally, the outbreak alerted health authorities to the importance of avoiding complacency. To eradicate polio in India, national and state governments and major international partners must work together effectively. Conducting highquality SIAs in a timely manner is essential in the final phase of the polio eradication campaign.
Vaccination Coverage Among Children Enrolled in Head Start Programs, Licensed Child Care Facilities, and Entering SchoolUnited States, 2000-01 School Year
The implementation of state and local requirements for vaccination before entry to Head Start programs, licensed child care facilities, and school has resulted in high vaccination levels among preschool and school children (1, 2) . One of the national health objectives for 2010 is to maintain >95% vaccination coverage among children attending licensed child care centers and kindergarten through postsecondary school (objective 12-23) (3). National estimates of vaccination coverage among children in Head Start programs, licensed child (4), the number of programs reporting and the completeness of the reports are lower than in previous years and do not permit precise estimation of coverage at the national level. IPs use school data to identify undervaccinated children enrolled in Head Start programs, licensed child care facilities, and those entering school; evaluate the success of prevention programs targeting these children; and document the proportion of children whose parents claim exemptions from one or more vaccines. Plans are ongoing to assist IPs in applying successful strategies for collecting, reporting, and increasing the precision of coverage estimates for these populations.
Methods of assessing vaccination coverage differ among the 56 IPs, in part because state and local laws determine which vaccines and doses are required and because sampling and data abstraction methods vary. IPs used a standard one-page form to report the proportion (2.9 to 100% for Head Start and child care, 0.9 to 100% for kindergarten and first grade) of eligible children included in the assessment and coverage for each required vaccine.
Head Start Programs
Of the 56 IPs, 23 states, New York City, and Chicago (44.6%) reported vaccination coverage for children enrolled in Head Start programs (Table 1 ). All 25 programs reported coverage for >3 doses of poliovirus vaccine; 17 (30.4%) reported coverage for 3 doses of hepatitis B (HepB) vaccine; 16 (28.6%) reported coverage for 4 doses of diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and pertussis (DTaP) vaccine, 1 dose of measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine, and 1 dose of Haemophilus influenzae type B (Hib) vaccine; and nine (16.1%) reported coverage for 3 doses of DTaP and for >3 doses of Hib. Of all 108 estimates of vaccination coverage reported for the Head Start group, 86 (79.6%) were >95%.
Licensed Child Care Facilities
Of the 56 IPs, 23 states, New York City, and Chicago (44.6%) submitted vaccination coverage levels for children enrolled in licensed child care ( 
Kindergarten/First Grade
Of the 56 IPs, 36 states and New York City (66.1%) submitted vaccination coverage levels for children enrolled in kindergarten and/or first grade ( Table 3 ). The number of programs reporting coverage varied by vaccine. All 37 programs reported coverage for >3 doses of poliovirus vaccine, 27 (48.2%) programs reported for 4 doses of DTaP and for 3 doses of HepB, 22 (39.3%) programs for 2 doses of MMR, 10 (17.9%) programs for 3 doses of DTaP, and six (10.7%) programs for 1 dose of MMR. Of all estimates of vaccination coverage reported for the kindergarten/first grade age group (n = 129), 99 (76.7%) were >95%. Editorial Note: Reported vaccination coverage for the 2000-01 school year for children in Head Start programs, licensed child care facilities, and those entering kindergarten and/or first grade appears similar to that reported in previous years. However, the number of programs reporting and the completeness of the reports are lower than in the past and do not permit coverage to be estimated reliably at the national level. For the 1999-2000 school year, eight territories were considered among the IPs. For the 2000-01 school year, no territories reported, resulting in a smaller number of IPs. In addition, some IPs that reported previously chose not to report for some facility types for the 2000-01 school year. These decreases in reporting and completeness from previous years might be attributed to a diversion of resources to other vaccination activities at both state and national levels.
The findings in this report are subject to at least three limitations. First, approximately 40% of the states and cities did not submit 2000-01 vaccination coverage estimates. Second, variation in sampling methodology among IPs might limit the generalizability and comparability of these data (4). Finally, children attending private schools were not surveyed by all of the programs.
Conducting regular assessments of vaccination coverage in group settings such as child care facilities and school are key in monitoring the impact of state requirements on vaccination coverage among U.S. children. These data are the only measure of vaccination coverage available for this population and the only data for measuring the 2010 national health objective. To assist state and local IPs in collecting and reporting coverage data for children in child care facilities and those entering school, CDC is developing a new reporting system that will improve data quality and facilitate the reporting process by automating many of the calculation/ data management tasks that IPs have previously performed manually. This automated system will decrease substantially the amount of personnel time devoted to producing annual reports. In addition, CDC has instituted a reminder system to alert IPs when reports are not submitted in a timely manner. These two approaches should facilitate participation from all IPs.
Smallpox Vaccine Adverse Events Among Civilians -United States, February 25-March 3, 2003
During the civilian smallpox vaccination program, CDC, the Food and Drug Administration, and state health departments are conducting surveillance for vaccine-associated adverse events. In the first stage of the program, active surveillance is being conducted for potentially life-threatening, moderate-to-severe, and other serious adverse events and for vaccinia transmission to contacts of vaccinees (1) (Table) . Nonserious events are reported through passive surveillance and are expected to be underreported. This report summarizes smallpox vaccine adverse events reported among civilians vaccinated as of February 28, 2003, and among contacts of vaccinees, received by CDC from the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) as of March 3.
Potentially life-threatening and moderate-to-serious events are classified on the basis of evidence in support of the reported diagnoses. For probable cases, other causes are excluded, and supportive information is available. Events are classified as suspected if they have clinical features compatible with the diagnosis but either further investigation is required or additional investigation of the case did not provide supporting evidence for the diagnosis and did not identify an alternative diagnosis. CDC and state and local health departments also receive reports of other events that are associated temporally with smallpox vaccination. Reported adverse events are not necessarily associated with vaccination, and some or all of these events might be coincidental.
During January 24-February 28, smallpox vaccine was administered to 12,690 civilian health-care and public health workers in 45 jurisdictions. No potentially life-threatening adverse events of a type known previously to be caused by smallpox vaccination have been reported as of March 3.
Two moderate-to-severe adverse events were reported (Table) . Both were probable cases of ocular vaccinia, and both were traced to contact with military personnel who received smallpox vaccine.
A woman aged 26 years slept in the same bed several times a week over a 3-week period with a military vaccinee beginning shortly after he received smallpox vaccine; he was reported often not to have kept his vaccination site covered. The woman became ill with swelling, pain, and discharge from the right eye, which progressed over the course of 1 week to swelling of the entire right side of the face, difficulty opening and impaired vision in the right eye, and increased exudate, despite treatment with antibacterial eyedrops. On February 22, she was hospitalized. Ophthalmologic examination revealed severe right scleral injection and chemosis, a small pustule at the right palpebral lower lid margin, and tender right preauricular and submandibular adenopathy but found no evidence of keratitis, iritis, or periocular lesions. Orbital computerized tomography scan was consistent with preseptal cellulitis without infection of the globe. The patient's preseptal cellulitis improved within 24 hours after treatment with intravenous antibiotics, and she was discharged on February 25. The following day, the patient was readmitted with persistent right blepharoconjunctivitis. Preliminary viral cultures of conjunctival fluid revealed cytopathic effect consistent with viral infection, and a direct fluorescent antibody test was positive for vaccinia. The patient improved within 24 hours after treatment with trifluridine eyedrops and a single dose of intravenous vaccinia immune globulin. She was discharged on February 28. The viral culture material and a swab sample from the patient's eye were sent to CDC and tested positive for vaccinia DNA by real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR).
On February 14, a woman aged 18 years with no history of smallpox vaccination handled the bandage of a military vaccinee. The woman had a pustular skin lesion (size: 1.5 cm) with a small satellite lesion on her right forearm 3 days after this contact and a second pustular lesion on the back of her upper right arm 5 days after contact, followed by irritation and swelling in her right eye 8 days after contact. The patient first sought medical attention 11 days after the contact and had a skin condition and bacterial conjunctivitis diagnosed, which were treated with an oral antibiotic; 14 days after contact, she was noted to have two small pustular lesions on her right eyelid and had blepharoconjunctivitis diagnosed. She had marked improvement within 24 hours after initiating treatment with trifluridine eye drops. Specimens taken from eye and skin lesions demonstrated vaccinia virus based on PCR.
Three other serious adverse events were reported (Table) . One case involved headache and dizziness; although headache has been reported after smallpox vaccination, the casual role of smallpox vaccine in this case is unknown. The other two events (cholecystitis and hypertension) are not known to be associated causally with smallpox vaccination.
A woman aged 38 years had headache and dizziness 5 days after smallpox vaccination; 6 days later, after the symptoms had increased in intensity, she was admitted to a hospital for evaluation. A neurologist observed no change in mental status or other neurologic deficits; an MRI brain scan showed no abnormalities. The patient's symptoms improved, and she was discharged 2 days later.
A man aged 46 years with a history of hypertension was hospitalized 1 day after vaccination with hypertension (blood pressure: approximately 230/120) and severe headache. The patient was treated with antihypertensive medications and was discharged after 1 day.
A woman aged 51 years had onset of chest discomfort, shortness of breath, and nausea 2 days after vaccination. The patient had cholelithiasis with ductal blockage diagnosed and had a cholecystectomy; she was discharged after 3 days.
Among the 46 vaccinees with reported other nonserious adverse events during January 24-March 3 ( Table) , the most common signs and symptoms were fever (n = 11), pruritus (n = 11), rash (n = 10), and pain (n = seven). All of these commonly reported events are consistent with mild expected reactions following receipt of smallpox vaccine. Some vaccinees reported multiple signs and symptoms.
Surveillance for adverse events during the civilian smallpox vaccination program is ongoing; regular surveillance reports will be published in MMWR.
Reported by: Smallpox Vaccine Adverse Events coordinators. National Center for Infectious Diseases; National Immunization Program, CDC.
Editorial Note: This report highlights the importance of proper vaccination site care in preventing contact transmission of vaccinia virus and the need for vacinees and unvaccinated persons who have contact with vaccinees to protect against contact transmission (2) . Vaccinees who do not work in healthcare settings should cover the vaccination site with a gauze bandage that is secured by first-aid adhesive tape and should change the bandage frequently (i.e., every 1-3 days). Vaccinees should keep the vaccination site dry, cover it with a waterproof bandage during bathing, and change back to a gauze bandage after bathing. Gauze bandages should be changed whenever they become wet. As an added precaution, vaccinees should wear a long-sleeved shirt that covers the vaccination site, particularly in situations involving close physical contact. Vaccinees should practice consistent hand hygiene by washing thoroughly with antimicrobial soap and water or with an approved alcohol-based hand-rub (i.e., one that contains >60% alcohol) after any contact with the vaccination site or Alaska  6  2  562  552  ------Hawaii  3  11  768  699  - - 3 All MMWR references are available on the Internet at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr. Use the search function to find specific articles.
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------References to non-CDC sites on the Internet are provided as a service to MMWR readers and do not constitute or imply endorsement of these organizations or their programs by CDC or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. CDC is not responsible for the content of these sites. URL addresses listed in MMWR were current as of the date of publication. with materials that have come into contact with the site, including bandages, clothing, towels, and sheets. Contaminated bandages and scabs from the vaccination site should be placed in a sealed plastic bag and discarded. Vaccinees should keep a separate laundry hamper for clothing, towels, sheets, and other items that might have come in direct contact with the vaccination site or with drainage from the site; these items should be washed by using hot water with detergent and/or bleach.
Contacts of vaccinees should not touch the vaccine site or any materials that might be contaminated with vaccine virus, including bandages, clothing, towels, or sheets. Contacts who touch any potentially contaminated materials inadvertently should wash their hands immediately. Vaccinated persons and their contacts who share a bed should be certain that the vaccination site is covered with a bandage and shirt sleeve.
